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Abstract 
A new measure of indirect shareholding is proposed and estimated for Japan's 
six major keiretsu groups. For these groups indirect shareholding by each firm 
in each other firm is about one fourth as great as direct shareholding on 
average. Where there are gains to firms from holding stock in other firms, 
there are also gains from indirect stockholding. Alignment of the firms into 
groups maximizes indirect shareholding. 
* 
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Indirect Shareholding Within Japan's Business Groups 
Many of the largest corporations in Japan are affiliated with one or 
another of six business groups, the modern counterparts of the pre-war 
zaibatsu. The firms affiliated with any one group are linked to one another by 
a complicated web of interlocking stockholding. Recent inquiries have 
identified economic rationales for one firm to hold shares in another. But 
direct shareholding links between pairs of firms need not align the firms into 
groups. Perhaps the economic rationale for the groups is in assuring that 
whatever bilateral shareholding interlocks are formed will also induce the 
greatest possible indirect shareholding among the same set of firms. Indirect 
shareholding exists when a company holds stock in a company that itself holds 
stock in another company. Whatever advantages reside in direct shareholding 
links are apt also to be present in the case of indirect shareholding. 
In this short note I propose a new measure of indirect shareholding, and 
describe estimates of the measure for Japanese keiretsu affilates using 1980 
data. 
1. Measuring indirect shareholding 
In this section I will propose a measure of indirect shareholding. The 
strategy is to characterize hypothetical bilateral shareholding ties between a 
pair of firms that, by themselves, would have the same influence on the two 
firms' choices of control variables as the more complicated web of indirect as 
*Banks in Japan hold stock in the companies to which they lend to reduce 
the agency costs of dobt (Shoard, 1089; Hath, 1900; Prowse ,1990, and Hoslii, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). Also companies acquire stock in rivals to 
achieve cartelization (Flath; forthcoming-a, and forthcoming-b). Cross-
shareholding interlocks between trading partners can be to attain vertical 
integration (Flath, 1989) or to bond firms to observe contractual stipulations 
(Flath, 1991). 
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well as direct share interlocks linking the two firms. The difference between 
these hypothetical share links and the actual direct share links between the 
pair of firms measure the indirect shareholding between them. 
Let us adopt the notational convention that vectors and matrices are 
denoted by underlined symbols and that scalars are denoted by non-underlined 
symbols. Suppose that there is a set of n firms among which there exist 
shareholding interlocks represented by the nxn matrix D with typical element 
5.. = fraction of j's shares held by i, where 0<s,.<l if i<j, and 5..=0 if i=j. 
The income of these firms, inclusive of returns from equity interests, may be 
denoted by the nxl vector ?r, and 
(1) 7T = Z + D 7T , 
where z is the nxl vector of operating profits of the firms, having typical 
2 
element z.. Write 
d') 2L = Y Z , 
where V=(_I-D)~ and I is the identity matrix. 
The extent of shareholding of any one keiretsu firm in another is 
typically far less than 10%, too small to confer control. Let us therefore 
maintain that the cross-shareholding D confers silent financial interests only 
and does not in any way affect the locus of control of the firms, that each 
firm controls its own product market choices but not those of any other 
including the ones in which it holds stock. Cross-shareholding will 
nevertheless affect the choices made by each firm in the real product markets 
2 
Fqnation (1') indicates the relation bcwccn market capitalization n'L_ and— 
the operating earnings of firms z'i_. As cross-shareholding becomes more 
extensive, given the operating earnings of firms, market capitalization 
increases without bound. Thus market capitalization embodies a form of double 
counting. This is becoming a widely recognized aspect of Japan's stock market. 
See for instance McDonald (1989) or Bierman (1990). 
according to its effects on the values of the firms' respective objective 
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functions TT.. . For instance if firms i and j are either trading partners, or 
rivals, or creditor and client, then their Nash noncooperative solution values 
of control variables Y , (e.g. product price, output, investment, terms of 
credit) solve a system that includes both 
where A. and A. are arbitrary constants and v.., v.., v.., and v.. are elements 
of the matrix V. Clearly equations (2) depend upon both direct and indirect 
shareholding links between firms i and j. 
Suitable choice of A. and A. will establish hypothetical bilateral direct 
shareholding interlocks between i and j that would by themselves induce the 
same choices x.* and x.* as does the complete matrix of direct and indirect 
interlocks that link the two firms. Specifically, let A., A., t.., and t.. be 
the solutions to the matrix equation 
Ellerman (1991) proposes a scheme in which the objectives of the firms 
are not to maximize the values of *-.. In Ellerman's scheme the decisions of 
firms linked by cross-shareholding ire according to the votes of "external_ 
shareholders" only (that is the firms themselves do nul vole the shares held by 
those firms in others), and the votes are weighted in proportion to the 
respective firms7 external shareholders7 direct and indirect claims on each 
firm's assets. Here indirect shareholding by firms has little meaning. 
Ellerman's elegant model is part of a normative prescription for reconstituting 
Yugoslovian firms, not a positive analysis of the keiretsu. 
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Now Ti . is the matrix of hypothetical bilateral shareholding interlocks 
between the two firms i and j that would have equivalent influence on their 
respective choices of control variables x. and x, as does the complete matrix 
of cross-shareholding D. The difference between the two matrices is a matrix 
whose off-diagonal elements are measures of indirect shareholding by each firm 
in the other. From (3) one finds that 
Now t.jj-S.jj and tji-s... measure indirect shareholding by i in j and by j in i 
respectively. 
As an illustrative example let us consider the case of three firms linked 
by cross-shareholding. Here 
If firm 1 holds shares in firm 3 and firm 3 holds shares in firm 2, then firm 
l's direct shareholding in firm 2 is augmented by indirect shareholding. 
Algebraically, if s13>0 and s32>0, then t12>*12. And t12-*12 is the 
precise amount of indirect shareholding by firm 1 in firm 2.4 
2- Indirect shareholding in the keiretsu groups 
The purpose of this section is to describe estimates of indirect 
shareholding in the six keiretsu groups of Japan using 1980 data. The focal 
firms are the member firms of the six respective "presidents' councils" of the 
major keiretsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo. 
There are about 175 companies including most of the largest ones in Japan. In 
1980 all together these companies comprised about a fourth of all corporate 
assets in Japan. For data on shareholding ties I have relied upon the annual: 
kigyo keiretsu soran, published by toyo keizai. The average fractions of 
outstanding shares held within the respective presidents' councils in 1980 
were: Sumitomo (27%), Mitsubishi (29%), Dai-Ichi Kangyo (14%), Sanwa (17%), 
Mitsui (17%), Fuyo (16%), but about half of these shares were held by financial 
Futatsugi (1976), Ch. 4, pp. 137-167, proposed as a measure of the  
closeness of the relation Between keiretsu firms the elements of the matrix V. 
The motivation for the measure was strictly ad hoc and seems to have been 
guided by analogy with some algebraics of input-output analysis. Yet its 
kinship with my proposed measure of indirect shareholding is clearly evident. 
Futatsugi's writings on cross-shareholding are extensive and well-known to 
Japanese economists. 
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institutions of the respective groups. Typically the direct share interest of 
any one company in another was in a range of 3% or less. 
The table summarizes the direct and indirect shareholding linking pairs of 
firms within each respective group. The first two columns summarize 
shareholding by financial firms only, that is banks and insurance companies. 
The middle columns detail shareholding links between nonfinancial firms and the 
final columns pertain to the pooled samples which include both nonfinancial and 
financial firms. Several conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, 
indirect shareholding is around one fourth as great as direct shareholding for 
most cells in the table, which seems large enough to matter. Second, indirect 
share links are greatest on average in the groups having the greatest direct 
share links, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi. Third, indirect and direct shareholding 
by financial firms are greater on average than shareholding by nonfinancial 
firms. 
3. Conclusion 
Firms hold stock in other firms for a variety of reasons including 
vertical integration, contract enforcement, cartelization, lowering the costs 
of financial intermediation and more. All have been offered as explanations 
for cross-shareholding which is prominent in Japan but also observed elsewhere. 
Where direct shareholding is advantageous so is indirect shareholding. 
The greatest extent of cross-shareholding in Japan is that linking firms 
that are members of a same business group. Alignment of firms into groups 
maYimi7PS thp pyfpnt nf inrh'rprt. sharnhnlHing t.hnt. rnsnlt.s from any rlirer.t. 
shareholding. By proposing and estimating a measure of indirect shareholding I 
have argued that indirect shareholding in the keiretsu groups, particularly 
indirect shareholding by keiretsu banks, is indeed large enough to be a 
plausible motivation for the groups' very existence. 
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Table. Indirect shareholding and direct shareholding within "presidents' 






direct shareholding and indirect shareholding between 







direct indirect direct indirect direct indirect 
Mitsui 
(24) 
3.85 j 0.68 
(2.23) ! (0.59) 
0.36 0.13 
(1.62) (0.18) 
0.99 ! 0.22 
(2.10) ! (0.35) 
Mitsubishi 
(28) 
3.96 | 1.65 
(2.27) i (1.44) 
1.01 0.18 
(5.55) j (0.31) 




3.32 \ 0.51 
(2.29) ! (0.37) 
0.20 l 0.09 
(1.49) | (0.11) 0.67 I 0.15 (1.90) j (0.22) 
Sumitomo 
(21) 
4.44 j 1.51 
(2.23) j (1.07) 
1.31 ! 0.31 
(4.45) \ (0.34) 
1.85 j 0.52 
(4.01) j (0.72) 
Sanwa 
(39) 
2.76 j 0.43 
(2.50) ! (0.52) 
0.24 0.04 
(2.99) j (0.06) 
0.50 j 0.08 




2.38 \ 0.41 
(3.07) j (0.67) 
0.17 0.04 
(1.20) j (0.12) 
0.38 1 0.08 
(1.60) | (0.26) 
All of the 
above 
3.26 0.77 
(2.62) j (0.95) 
0.38 1 0.09 
(2.89) j (0.18) 
0.74 0.17 
(2.92) j (0.43) 
"Indirect shareholding" between pairs of firms was computed from the direct 
shareholding matrix for each keiretsu as described in the text. Source for 
"direct shareholding": Toyo Keizai, kigyo keiretsu soran. 1982 edition, 
selected Tables, pp. 29-53. 
